DISSENTING VIEWS OF CHAIRMAN DANIEL R. PEARSON
Based on the record in these preliminary investigations, I find that there is no reasonable indication that an industry in the United States is materially injured or threatened with material injury by reason of imports of coated free sheet paper (“CFSP”) from China, Indonesia, and Korea that are allegedly subsidized and sold in the United States at less than fair value (“LTFV”).
THE LEGAL STANDARD FOR PRELIMINARY DETERMINATIONS
The legal standard for preliminary antidumping and countervailing duty determinations requires the Commission to determine, based upon the information available at the time of the preliminary determinations, whether there is a reasonable indication that a domestic industry is materially injured by or threatened with material injury, or that the establishment of an industry is materially retarded, by reason of the allegedly unfairly traded imports.1 In applying this standard, the Commission weighs the evidence before it and determines whether “(1) the record as a whole contains clear and convincing evidence that there is no material injury or threat of such injury; and (2) no likelihood exists that contrary evidence will arise in a final investigation.”2
NO REASONABLE INDICATION OF MATERIAL INJURY BY REASON OF THE SUBJECT IMPORTS3
In the preliminary phase of antidumping or countervailing duty investigations, the Commission determines whether there is a reasonable indication that an industry in the United States is materially injured by reason of the imports under investigation.4 In making this determination, the Commission must consider the volume of subject imports, their effect on prices for the domestic like product, and their impact on domestic producers of the domestic like product, but only in the context of U.S. production operations.5 The statute defines “material injury” as “harm which is not inconsequential, immaterial, or unimportant.”6 In assessing whether there is a reasonable indication that the domestic industry is materially injured by reason of subject imports, we consider all relevant economic factors that bear on the state of the industry in the United States.7 No single factor is dispositive, and all relevant factors are
1 19 U.S.C. § 1673b(a); see also American Lamb Co. v. United States, 785 F.2d 994, 1001-04 (Fed Cir. 1986); Ranchers-Cattlemen Action Legal Foundation v. United States, 74 F.Supp.2d 1353, 1368-69 (CIT 1999); Aristech Chemical Corp. v. United States, 20 CIT 353, 354-55 (1996).
2 American Lamb, 785 F.2d at 1001; see also Texas Crushed Stone Co. v. United States, 35 F.3d 1535, 1543 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
3 I adopt as my own the discussion of domestic like product, domestic industry, related parties, negligibility, cumulation, and conditions of competition as laid out in sections I–VI.A of the Views of the majority. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(24)(A)(I)(I).
19 U.S.C. §§ 1671b(a) and 1673b(a).
5 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(B)(i). The Commission “may consider such other economic factors as are relevant to the determination” but shall “identify each [such] factor . . . [a]nd explain in full its relevance to the determination.” 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(B). See also Angus Chemical Co. v. United States, 140 F.3d 1478 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(A).
19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(C)(iii).