also Baxter Healthcare Corp. v. Healthdyne, Inc., 944 F.2d 1573 (11th Cir. 1991) (holding that documents may be admitted under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(6) even though they are records of a business entity other than the proponent, and there is no requirement that the person whose first-hand knowledge that was the basis of the entry be identified, so long as it was the recording entity’s business practice to obtain such information from persons with first-hand knowledge).
10 11 Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Carabetta, 739 A.2d 311 (Conn. App. Ct. 1999). Id. Id. 127 F.3d 595 (7th Cir. 1997). Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Carabetta, 739 A.2d 311 (Conn. App. Ct. 1999). The court held that computer records offered by the plaintiff to prove defendants’ debt interest were admissible under the business records exception to the hearsay rule and that the computer records w e r e p r o p e r l y a u t h e n t i c a t e d t h r o u g h w i t n e s s t e s t i m o n y . 12 13 14 1 5 The technician acknowledged that her testimony was based solely on computer records from Federal Deposit.
16 The court noted that it was not prepared to identify what status in a particular company’s hierarchy a witness must have in order to be sufficiently knowledgeable to testify about computer records.
17 18 U.S. v. Duncan, NMCM No. 89-1398, 1990 CMR LEXIS 510 (M.J. May 25, 1990). People v. Houston, 679 N.E.2d 1244 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997). People v. Casey, 587 N.E.2d 511 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992). People v. Houston, 679 N.E.2d 1244 (1997). Defendant was convicted of telephone fraud. At trial, the court admitted as business records reports that were generated in the course of the investigation. The bulk of the billing was generated instantaneously by the computer when telephone calls were placed from defendant’s accounts and were subsequently downloaded in an unaltered form. 19 20
21 486 N.E.2d 877 (1985). The Defendant was charged with making an obscene phone call to complainant. During the police investigation of the call, the telephone company was asked to place a “trap” on the complainant’s telephone, by which a computer automatically recorded the telephone numbers of all telephones calling the “trapped” telephone. The court adopted the reasoning of the Supreme Court of Louisiana and concluded that the “printout results of computerized telephone tracing equipment is not hearsay of the type contemplated” by the Louisiana Rules of Evidence “but represents a self-generated record of its operations. . . .” The court held that admission of the printout results requires proof of the method of the recording of the information and the proper functioning of the device by which it was recorded.
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