Exchange only if the Ad Exchange generates higher revenues or proves a better use for the inventory than these other alternatives.
Even if they joined DoubleClick's ad exchange, DoubleClick's current customers would therefore be likely to go on selling ad space through different exchanges and continue to rely on DFP's ad arbitration to select which ad to serve onto each requested web page. There would therefore be no exclusivity for DoubleClick's ad exchange in dealing with these customers and its advantage of already having commercial relations with many large customers would not help it much in competing with other ad exchanges.
In conclusion, while DoubleClick’s present business relations with publishers and advertisers represent an important asset, it has been shown that it cannot be established that such relations are so unique and can be so easily leveraged into intermediation services that they would give it any better chance of competing in the market where there are many established players, and in particular where such players are already able to offer intermediation and ad serving services.
184.108.40.206.3. Network effects deriving from DoubleClick's use of information about consumer behaviour collected through ad serving
As explained in more detail in paragraphs 181-189, DoubleClick, as a market
leader on the markets for advertiser-side and publisher-side ad on its own servers that host its products DFP and DFA customers, considerable amounts of data records each time through DFP or DFA.
serving, collects, on behalf of its an ad is served
If this (ad serving) data allowed DoubleClick to offer a service to its ad intermediation customers that is superior to the service offered by its competitors in the intermediation market which do not have access to this data, advertisers and publishers would inevitably flock to DoubleClick's ad serving and, by extension, to its newly-created ad intermediation service, by virtue of a direct network effect and DoubleClick’s bundled offering (ad serving plus ad intermediation) could be very well placed to compete with Google's bundled offering (which would be weaker on behavioural targeting but stronger on search capabilities and established as a successful integrated platform).
As has been explained in paragraph 183, DoubleClick is currently contractually prohibited from using data created through the use of DFA for the purpose of improving ad serving to publishers or advertisers other than the one advertiser on behalf of which the data was generated and collected. Similarly, data created through the use of DFP contractually belongs to the publisher whose website it relates to and DoubleClick cannot therefore make this data available to other publishers or advertisers nor use it to improve ad targeting for other publishers or advertisers. Consequently, the availability of considerable amounts of CPI data does not bring about network effects benefiting DoubleClick in the ad serving market, let alone in the intermediation market.