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not give it a strong advantage with regard to its entrance into the ad intermediation business. For the same reasons for which there are no network effects in the ad serving market, there are also no network effects in the intermediation market, as any network effects in this related market would be derived from those which could arise in the ad serving market through the cross use of data created through the use of DFA or DFP.

  • 276.

    Advertisers and publishers use third-party ad serving technology to enable them to monetize their inventory and would not want information related to their sales made available to competitors. The ability to record and report on the performance of an ad campaign in a way that protects the confidentiality of an advertiser’s data is an important part of the business model of an advertiser-side ad server, and it is equally important to publishers that the publisher-side ad server protects confidentiality.

  • 277.

    Additionally, it is worth noting that the performance of an ad campaign is not comparable across entities. Not only does DoubleClick have no incentive or contractual right to look at ad campaign performance across entities, the data itself is also of limited utility because each individual client defines its own metrics within the DoubleClick products. Both advertisers and publishers insist upon strict confidentiality provisions in their ad serving contracts to prevent their rivals from benefiting from their data. The required contractual provisions prohibit the use of the data by DoubleClick, including the sharing of such data with other customers or any other third party, other than for purposes that the customers themselves expressly permit. The fact that customers do not allow ad servers to share their data with, or to use it for the benefit of, their rivals or their own customers indicates that any value to them from enhanced ad serving performance would be outweighed by the actual or perceived advantages that such data sharing would confer upon their competitors. If DoubleClick did not agree to, or violated, the confidentiality provisions upon which its customers insist, there would be alternative ad serving providers to which these customers could and would switch. Indeed, it is notable that DoubleClick did not try to, and in fact never even considered trying to, change the contracts in order to introduce more successfully Ad Exchange.


            Conclusion regarding the elimination of DoubleClick as a potential competitor

    • 278.

      It can be concluded from the above that, despite Google's strong market position in intermediation, the proposed merger does not have significant anti- competitive effects with a view to the elimination of DoubleClick as a potential competitor of Google. While it is not excluded that DoubleClick would have grown into an effective competitive force in online ad intermediation services, it is rather likely that a sufficient number of other competitors would be left in the market which could maintain sufficient competitive pressure after the merger. DoubleClick would still be a new entrant which would face not only Google, but also other companies such as Microsoft, AOL, Yahoo!, TradeDoubler, Zanox, AdLink, Interactive Media, Tomorrow Focus, Oridian and ValueClick who also possess strong advantages, including, for some of these players, (in-house) ad serving technology, and are far more advanced in the development of their intermediation services.


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