European direct partners have a similar duration as DoubleClick's ad serving contracts with publishers, the average duration being approximately [<3]* years. Even the parties therefore concede that the contractual differences between AFS partners and DFP customers are relatively limited. The practical difficulties described for the advertiser side thus do not appear to apply to the publisher side to any similar extent. Such practical difficulties therefore do not appear to affect the merged entity's ability to engage in the described bundling strategy on the publisher side.
Secondly, the extent to which the described bundling strategy results in foreclosure depends, amongst other things, on the extent to which demand for the merged entity's rivals' ad serving products is reduced by the tie. In this respect, the extent to which there is a common pool of customers that purchase both products may be relevant. If there are lots of users of DFA or DFP or competing ad serving products who do not sell or purchase search ads or whose sales or purchases of search ads are very low in value, then the effect on demand is less likely to be significant, and foreclosure less likely to occur. On the other hand, foreclosure is more likely to be effective, if there is considerable overlap between advertisers and publishers that use Google's search ads or its (search) ad intermediation services and advertisers and publishers that use DFA or DFP or competing ad serving products.
According to the notifying party, only [less than 0.1%]* out of Google's more than […]* advertiser customers in the EEA which purchase search ads from Google (either directly or through intermediation) also use DFA. The notifying party estimates the share of these overlapping customers on the advertiser side represented in Google's search advertising revenues (including direct sales and intermediated sales) to be approximately [<20%]*. On the publisher side, the corresponding numbers and percentages are even lower. In fact, only [less than 0.1%]* out of Google's more than […]* publisher customers in the EEA which sell advertising space through Google AdSense (only […]* of which sell search ads whereas […]* publisher customers sell only contextual ads, and […]* sell both search ads and contextual through Google) also use DFP and the share of the overlapping customers on the publisher side represented in Google's AdSense net revenues is only around [<10%]*. Corresponding figures for advertisers and publishers which sell or purchase (search) advertising space through Google and which are customers of competing ad serving technology providers are not available. However, as DoubleClick is the leading provider of ad serving technology to both advertisers and publishers, it is unlikely that such figures would change the overall impression that the common pool of customers of Google and DoubleClick is currently fairly limited177. This at least reduces the merged entity's ability to foreclose rivals in the ad serving market.
Thirdly, the merged entity will face vertically integrated competitors that
could replicate the strategy of bundling search advertising and advertiser side
In the light of DoubleClick's market shares of 40-50%, it seems unlikely that the total number of customers which use both DoubleClick's or any competing ad serving technology and Google's search ad (intermediation) services would be much more than twice the overlap between Google's and DoubleClick's customers on the advertiser side and on the publisher side.