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On February 8, 2008, the case was re-assigned to human rights referee J. Allen Kerr,

Jr., who in response to subsequent motions, continued the hearing in damages to April

14, 2008 upon which date the hearing convened, the complainant presented testimony

and entered exhibits into evidence. The defendant did not appear.

Upon entering a default, the presiding officer shall conduct a hearing which will be

limited to determining the relief necessary to eliminate the discriminatory practice and

make the complainant whole. Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies § 46a-54-88a.

The default admits the material facts that constitute a cause of action and conclusively

determines the liability of a defendant. See Skyler Limited Partnership v. S.P. Douthett

& Company, Inc.., 212 Conn. 802 (1989).

Evidence need not be offered to support

those allegations, and the only issue before the tribunal is the determination of

damages. See Carothers v. Butkin Precision Mfg. Co., 37 Conn. App. 208, 209 (1995).

The entry of a default also operates as a confession by the defendant to the truth of the

material facts alleged in the complaint. Murray v. Taylor, 65 Conn. App. 300, cert.

denied, 258 Conn. 928 (2001).

As a result of the default, and based upon the pleadings, I conclude that the

complainant was discriminated against on the basis of her sex, sexually harassed,

retaliated against and terminated from her employment on the basis of her sex in

violation of General Statutes §§ 46a-60 (a) (1), 46a-60 (a) (8), 46a-58 (a) and Title VII of

the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 2000e and the Civil Rights Act of

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