story characters (Maisy, Tommy, and Georgia), and told each child that the characters would be playing a game with them. Each child was read five differ- ent stories, including one initial neutral warm-up story designed to further acquaint the child with the Playhouse.
The four experimental stories all included a narrative and three or four follow-up questions. Each child was read a story about two characters who place a specific object in a specific location. One of the characters leaves and the other character moves the object to another location. It was empha- sized that the character who leaves goes to a location from which he cannot see in, to eliminate any ambi- guity. The child was then asked if the character who left saw the other character move the object (com- prehension question). Next, the child was asked where the character who left thinks the object is (false-belief question). Finally, the child was asked to pick from two emotion faces (either surprised or unhappy, and neutral) how the character who left feels when he returns and sees that the object is not in its original location (emotion question).
p<0.05; ENPU: t(27)=6.6, p<0.05). For those chil- dren who passed the false belief tasks, performance on the emotion questions was well above chance (EPS: t(19)=9, p<0.05; ENPS: t(19)=5.8, p<0.05; EPU: t(19)=9, p<0.05; ENPU: t(19)=5.8, p<0.05). Those children who failed the false belief tasks had trouble with the surprise questions (EPS: t(7)=0, p=1; ENPS: t(7)=0.7, p=0.5), but performed well above chance on the unhappy questions (EPU: t(7)=3, p<0.05; ENPU: t(7)=3, p<0.05).
A One-way ANOVA was performed to deter- mine whether or not children who passed the false belief tasks performed similarly on the emotion questions to those who failed the false belief tasks. Passers and failers of the false belief tasks performed similarly on the unhappy questions, but failers had significantly more trouble with the planning surprise question than passers (F(1,26)=10.2, p<0.05). There was less of a difference between the passers and fail- ers on the non-planning surprise question (F(1,26)=3.1, p=0.092), and no difference on the unhappy questions (EPU: F(1,26)=0.46, p=0.5; ENPU: F(1,26)=0.035, p=0.85).
Two of the stories allowed the child to plan a portion of the story. Each child was asked directly after one character left where the other character should hide the object. During all stories, children were permitted to perform the narrated manipula- tions of the movable parts in the Playhouse, the paper objects, and the paper dolls.
Planning appeared to have no effect on the understanding of emotion questions. A McNemar's x2 test revealed no difference between planning and non-planning for surprise or unhappy questions (N=28, p=1.0). In general, false belief questions were no easier than questions about surprise (t(27)=- 1.4, p=0.184), however, as mentioned above, those who failed the false belief tasks had significantly more trouble answering questions about surprise than those who passed the false belief tasks (F(1,26)=8.3, p<0.05).
As predicted, most of the children passed the false belief questions. Planning did not seem to have an effect on children's ability to pass the false belief questions. A one-sample t-test (refer to data in Table 1) was conducted to compare the mean responses of each variable of surprise and unhappy individually to chance, or 0.5. Overall, performance on emotion questions was better than chance (EPS: t(27)=4.4, p<0.05; ENPS: t(27)=4.4, p<0.05; EPU: t(27)=8.6,
While the results of this study may contradict the original hypothesis that planning would increase children's understandings of belief-based emotions (and thus replicate Pasquale's (2001) findings), the
Table 1. Performance on Belief and Emotion Tasks
FB = False Belief; E = Emotion; S = Surprise; U = Unhappy; P = Planning; NP = Non-Planning
Perspectives in Psychology