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EUROPEAN COMMISSION DG Competition - page 102 / 113

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licensing an IPR protected technology should not impair consumers’ ability to benefit from innovation brought about by the dominant undertaking’s competitors.

9.2.3 REFUSAL TO SUPPLY INFORMATION NEEDED FOR INTEROPERABILITY

Special case when enables Domco to leverage dominance from one market to another 241. A special case arises when an undertaking refuses to supply information in a way that allows it to extend its dominance from one market to another. This is the case for information necessary for interoperability between one market and another. Although there is no general obligation even for dominant companies to ensure interoperability, leveraging market power from one market to another by refusing interoperability information may be an abuse of a dominant position.

Even if information is a trade secret 242. Even if such information may be considered a trade secret it may not be appropriate to apply to such refusals to supply information the same high standards for intervention as those described in the previous subsection.

  • 10.

    AFTERMARKETS

    • 10.1

      INTRODUCTION

Secondary markets - examples 243. Aftermarkets are also sometimes called “secondary markets”. Such markets comprise complementary products (or “secondary products”) that are purchased after the purchase of another product (the “primary product”) to which it relates. Standard examples include after sales services and spare parts for durable goods, as well as consumables such as ink cartridges and toner for printers and photocopiers. However, also upgrades of computer software may be considered aftermarkets.

Supplier of primary product may try to reserve secondary market for itself

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