The plaintiff appealed from that decision to the board, which affirmed the commissioner’s decision. The plain- tiff then appealed from the board’s decision to this court, but we dismissed the appeal for lack of a final decision.
A formal hearing was held on April 2, 2003, regarding the plaintiff’s claim of total incapacity. Testimony was heard and evidence was submitted, but Lerner’s report was not admitted as a full exhibit pursuant to the July 24, 2001 order because the plaintiff never submitted to the defendants’ vocational rehabilitation examination. On June 24, 2003, the commissioner found in favor of the defendants and dismissed the claim for total incapacity benefits. The plaintiff appealed from that decision to the board, which affirmed the commission- er’s decision. This appeal followed.
The plaintiff’s arguments rest on the proposition that the board improperly affirmed the decisions of the com- missioner. We note that ‘‘[t]he review [board’s] hearing of an appeal from the commissioner is not a de novo hearing of the facts. . . . [I]t is oblig[ated] to hear the appeal on the record and not retry the facts. [T]he power and duty of determining the facts rests on the commissioner, the trier of facts. . . . [T]he conclu- sions drawn by him from the facts found must stand unless they result from an incorrect application of the law to the subordinate facts or from an inference ille- gally or unreasonably drawn from them.’’ (Internal quo- tation marks omitted.) Rogers v. Laidlaw Transit, Inc., 45 Conn. App. 204, 206, 695 A.2d 1071 (1997). ‘‘On appeal, the board must determine whether there is any evidence in the record to support the commissioner’s findings and award.’’ Bryan v. Sheraton-Hartford Hotel, 62 Conn. App. 733, 739, 774 A.2d 1009 (2001). We now turn to the plaintiff’s arguments.
The plaintiff maintains that the board improperly affirmed the commissioner’s decision to compel the plaintiff to undergo a vocational rehabilitation examina- tion by a nonphysician and the commissioner’s subse- quent decision to exclude evidence from the plaintiff’s own vocational rehabilitation expert because of her refusal to comply with the order. We disagree.
When the defendants attempted to compel the plain-
rehabilitation expert, she refused, arguing that an inde- pendent medical examination with a nonphysician vocational rehabilitation specialist would be an inva- sion of her personal privacy as defined by General Stat- utes § 52-178a.2 She contends that because a nonphysician vocational rehabilitation specialist does not practice a healing art under General Statutes § 20- 1,3 the commissioner cannot order such an examination.