board properly affirmed the decision of the commis- sioner.
The plaintiff also argues that the board improperly affirmed the commissioner’s decision to exclude evi- dence from her own vocational rehabilitation specialist because of her refusal to comply with the order to submit to the defendants’ examination. We disagree.
‘‘Practice Book § [13-14]7 authorizes the trial court to grant a wide range of relief . . . for a party’s failure to [submit to a physical or mental examination]. The determination of whether to enter sanctions pursuant to [Practice Book § 13-14] and, if so, what sanction or sanctions to impose, is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court. . . . In reviewing a claim that this discretion has been abused the unquestioned rule is that great weight is due to the action of the trial court and every reasonable presumption should be given in favor of its correctness. . . . [T]he ultimate issue is whether the court could reasonably conclude as it did.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Amba Realty Corp. v. Kochiss, 67 Conn. App. 149, 151–52, 786 A.2d 1137 (2001), cert. denied, 259 Conn. 912, 789 A.2d 993 (2002).
Additionally, the commissioner has broader discre- tion over evidence than does a trial court. General Stat- utes § 31-298 provides in relevant part that ‘‘the commissioner shall proceed, so far as possible, in accor- dance with the rules of equity. He shall not be bound by the ordinary common law or statutory rules of evidence or procedure, but shall make inquiry, through oral testimony, deposition testimony or written and printed records, in a manner that is best calculated to ascertain the substantial rights of the parties and carry out the provisions and intent of this chapter. . . .’’ (Emphasis added.) In accordance with the broad sanc- tion power of Practice Book § 13-14 and the mandate of § 31-298 that the commissioner protect the substantial rights of the parties while exercising his broad, equita- ble powers to take evidence and to carry out the provi- sions of chapter 568 of the General Statutes, we hold that the commissioner did not abuse his discretion in precluding the plaintiff from admitting evidence from her vocational rehabilitation expert when she disre- garded the commissioner’s order to submit to an exami- nation by the defendants’ expert. Thus, the board properly affirmed the decision of the commissioner.
The plaintiff next argues that the board was without jurisdiction to decide that she did not meet the require- ments for total incapacity because the Social Security Administration has deemed her totally disabled from work for purposes of receiving social security disability benefits. We disagree and conclude that a finding by