the Social Security Administration that the plaintiff is disabled for purposes of social security disability bene- fits does not preempt a workers’ compensation commis- sion from making its own independent determination concerning ability to work.
The claim in essence is a collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, argument. ‘‘[C]ollateral estoppel precludes a party from relitigating issues and facts actually and necessarily determined in an earlier proceeding between the same parties or those in privity with them upon a different claim.’’ Dowling v. Finley Associates, Inc., 248 Conn. 364, 373–74, 727 A.2d 1245 (1999).
‘‘An issue is actually litigated if it is properly raised in the pleadings or otherwise, submitted for determina- tion, and in fact determined.’’ (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 374. We have determined that that the issue of total incapacity was not actually litigated. The standards of the Social Secu- rity Administration in adjudicating total disability are not the same standards used by our workers’ compensa- tion commission and, thus, a commissioner may decline to admit them into evidence. See Krajewski v. Atlantic Aerospace Textron, 15 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 44, 2120 CRB-6-94-8 (Nov. 28, 1995).8
Additionally, ‘‘[t]o assert successfully the doctrine of issue preclusion . . . a party must establish that the issue sought to be foreclosed actually was litigated and determined in the prior action between the parties or their privies, and that the determination was essential to the decision in the prior case.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dowling v. Finley Associates, Inc., supra, 248 Conn. 374. We note that the defendants in this case were not parties to the Social Security Admin- istration action and were not in privity with any of the parties. See Mazziotti v. Allstate Ins. Co., 240 Conn. 799, 813, 695 A.2d 1010 (1997) (collateral estoppel ‘‘requires an identity of issues between the prior and subsequent proceedings and operates only against the same parties or those in privity with them’’). Addition- ally, any right to intervene in the social security action ‘‘does not, in the absence of its exercise, subject one possessing it to the risk of being bound by the result of the litigation . . . .’’ 47 Am. Jur. 2d 77, Judgments § 659 (1995); see also Young v. Metropolitan Property & Casualty Ins. Co., 60 Conn. App. 107, 115, 758 A.2d 452, cert. denied, 255 Conn. 906, 762 A.2d 912 (2000). Therefore, the prior findings should not be given preclu- sive effect, and we hold that the findings of total disabil- ity by the Social Security Administration are not binding on the workers’ compensation commission.
The plaintiff also contends that the board improperly affirmed the commissioner’s decision that she had not sustained her burden of proving that she met the