requirements for total incapacity benefits. We disagree.
‘‘[T]he power and duty of determining the facts rests on the commissioner, the trier of facts. . . . The con- clusions drawn by him from the facts found must stand unless they result from an incorrect application of the law to the subordinate facts or from an inference ille- gally or unreasonably drawn from them.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Dichello v. Holograth Corp., 49 Conn. App. 339, 352–53, 715 A.2d 765 (1998).
General Statutes § 31-307 (a) provides in relevant part that a plaintiff shall receive benefits ‘‘[i]f any injury for which compensation is provided under the provisions of this chapter results in total incapacity to work . . . .’’ The plaintiff relies on Osterlund v. State, 135 Conn. 498, 66 A.2d 363 (1949), for the proposition that when a plaintiff is capable of working, but ‘‘his physical condition due to his injury is such that he cannot in the exercise of reasonable diligence find an employer who will employ him, he is just as much totally incapaci- tated as though he could not work at all.’’ Id., 506–507; see also Hidvegi v. Nidec Corp., 3607 CRB-05-97-05 (June 15, 1998) (although plaintiff had light duty capac- ity, she was temporarily totally disabled because she was not capable of any degree of work and not employ- able on basis of physical restrictions, age, limited educa- tion, lack of transferable skills). The plaintiff here argues that her claim is such a case. We disagree.
The plaintiff is a fifty-four year old woman who emi- grated to the United States in 1991. Her only job in the United States has been working as a housekeeper for the Hartford Golf Club. Although she attended college for four years and worked as a biology and chemistry teacher in Romania, her attempts to secure other work, including a teacher’s aide position, have failed. Here, difficulty stems from that fact that while she is conver- sationally competent in English, she is not fluent and has been unable to pass a driver’s license examination. In 2000, Krompinger opined that the plaintiff was capa- ble of sedentary work only, but that she may be a candi- date for social security disability benefits because of her educational background and functional capacity. Jay Cudrin, a psychologist, examined the plaintiff for the purpose of a social security disability determination and opined that the plaintiff was afflicted with depressive disorder that may be secondary to her medi- cal condition and that her IQ bordered on mental retar- dation, but that ‘‘there is no doubt that this score grossly underestimated her actual intelligence level. Her perfor- mance on this test was severely hampered by her prob- lems with English and the fact that she lived in another country until about ten years ago.’’ He also stated that she had severe problems with consistent attention and concentration.