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generally seek contribution from joint tortfeasors for the excess she paid the plaintiff. (The equitable share of each defendant could be less or more depending on whether the negligence of absent or immune tortfeasors were considered.)

Defendants who have been released by the plaintiff in good faith and certain kinds of immune defendants such as negligent employers covered by workers' compensation's exclusivity statutes add additional complexity and variability to the contribution equation. In addition, certain kinds of defendants who are only vicariously or derivatively liable may be able to maintain common law indemnity actions against others who are under an obligation to assume the responsibility. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 4, at 475-77.

Finally, there is the problem of the insolvent tortfeasor whether joined or not. That ease provides the principal subject matter of this article. The authors argue for a rule that considers and compares the fault of the insolvent tortfeasor, whether it is negligence or intentional conduct, and subjects it and the fault of others to a several liability rule.

(n158) See generally, Ray J. Aiken, Proportioning Comparative Negligence--Problems of Theory and Special Verdict Formulation, 53 MARQ. L. REV. 293 (1970); Damon Ball, A Reexamination of Joint and Several Liability Under a Comparative Negligence System, 18 ST. MARY'S L.J. 891 (1989); Kim B. Childs, The Apportionment of Tort Responsibility, 14 COLO. LAW. 741 (May 1985); Richard A. Epstein, Two Fallacies in the Law of Joint Torts, 73 GEO. L.J. 1377 (1985); James Granelli, The Attack on Joint and Several Liability, 71 A.B.A. J. 61 (July 1985); David Kaye & Mikel Aickin, A Comment on Causal Apportionment, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 191 (1984); Lewis A. Kornhauser & Richard L. Reveez, Sharing Damages Among Multiple Tortfeasors, 98 YALE L.J. 831 (1989) [hereinafter Sharing Damages]; Lewis A. Kornhauser & Richard L. Revesz, Apportioning Damages Among Potentially Insolvent Actors; 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 617 (1990); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Joint and Multiple Tortfeasors: An Economic Analysis, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 517 (1980); Robert A. Leflar, Contribution and Indemnity Between Tortfeasors, U. PA. L. REV. 130 (1932); William J. McNichols, Judicial Elimination of Joint and Several Liability Because of Comparative Negligence -- A Puzzling Choice, 32 OKLA. L. REV. 1 (1979); Marie D. Mendelson, Tort Reform: Ensuring the Most Equitable Results for Plaintiffs and Defendants?, 31 ARIZ. L. REV. 171 (1989); Richard N. Pearson, Apportionment of Losses Under Comparative Fault Laws -- An Analysis of the Alternatives, 40 LA. L. REV. 343 (1980); Lisa M. Pennock, The Effect of Comparative Fault on Personal Injury Awards in Malpractice Lawsuits Involving Multiple Tortfeasors, 6 J. LEGAL MED. 223 (1985); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Encouraging Safety: The Limits of Tort Law and Government Regulation, 33 VAND. L. REV. 1281 (1980); Larry Pressler & Kevin V. Schieffer, Joint and Several Liability: A Case for Reform, 64 DEN. U. L. REV. 651 (1988); William Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 41 CAL. L. REV. 1 (1953); Mario J. Rizzo & Frank S. Arnold, Causal Apportionment: Reply to the Critics, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 219 (1986); Mario J. Rizzo & Frank S. Arnold, Causal Apportionment in the Law of Torts: An Economic Theory, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1399 (1980); Florrie Roberts, The Relatively Insolvent Joint Tortfeasor and the Good Faith Settlement, 20 LOY. L.A.L. REV. 247 (1987); James J. Scheske, The Reform of Joint and Several Liability Theory: A Survey of State Approaches, 54 J. AIR L. & COM. 627 (1988); Victor E. Schwartz, Comparative Negligence in Indiana: A Unique Statute That Will Reshape the Law, 17 IND. L. REV. 957 (1984); David R. Smith & John W.


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