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One Tribe at a Time

Second, the TETs will be living with the tribe in its village, so calling in air strikes on your own village is not an option, unless the decision is made by the tribal leader in extreme circumstances. e tribal leader will be the nal authority to make the call for air support, thus avoiding civilian casualties in his tribal domain.

  • ird, TETs living inside the village, not in some

distant rebase, will increase the security of the vil- lage. e enemy will have to be much more aggressive to penetrate the tribal area, and that will dramatically increase the chances that we (the TET and Arbakai) will be able to kill them.

Fourth, the TETs will decrease the need for both US and Afghan government forces by training and advising a Tribal Security Force (TSF) or Arbakai. e Arbakai could be trained, equipped and organized as a modular, loose-knit unit. Eventually each TSF could be integrated into a kind of confederation—with district, regional and national units—to ght against any greater threat. Attack one tribe and you attack us all. is will take years to accomplish, but it will have tremendous enduring benets for all concerned.

Fifth, the TETs must develop their own Informa- tion Operations and provide ground reports to all news media—the story has to be told. International media coverage of Muslim countries is extremely important. Seventy to eighty percent of the Afghan population cannot read, so videos and the spoken word in Pashto will be essential. is strategy will not work without a major Information Operations (IO) campaign.

Tactical Tribal Engagement

Tactical Tribal Engagement (TTE) is one possible solution in certain areas for the current problems facing the United States military in Afghanistan. is tactical strategy has far-reaching eects that will impact the operational and strategic nature of the war not only in Afghanistan, but across the border region of eastern Afghanistan and the ungoverned areas of the FATA (Federally Administered Tribal Areas) in Pakistan, specically the northern FATA areas.

Essential TTE Tasks:

  • 1.

    Establish and maintain rapport with the chosen tribe in the area. Advise and assist its leaders in all matters.

  • 2.

    Provide real security for the village. Not presence patrols, but 24/7 on-site security. A permanent presence that the tribes can rely on. “Advise, assist, train, equip and lead” a TSF, an Arbakai.

  • 3.

    Facilitate tactical civic action programs. Integra- tion with the local Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) is crucial, along with the ability to use funds that units have at their disposal for “quick” money to help tribes who are facilitating the success of CF and the Afghan government.

    • e TETs would also address basic health care and infrastructure services (water, electricity and irrigation), construction and repair of schools and clinics, both to improve the life of the tribe and employ its individual members for pay. ese programs should be worked through the local/ district/provincial/national government when possible and be integrated into the US battle space owner’s overall plan.

  • 4.

    Employ an aggressive tactical PSYOP plan that ties into the overall strategic IO campaign in the area. Tribes also can heavily counter the Taliban pro- paganda. is is a critical aspect of the success of the TTE strategy. e world has to see the Afghan tribes and US soldiers working, living, laughing,

    • ghting and dying together.

5. Report “Ground Truth” continuously. is activity would tie the tribe in with all levels of the govern- ment system. It would also be the process by which the tribe’s concerns are relayed directly to the CF military apparatus. Such ongoing account- ing would serve as a check and balance, reporting what is actually happening on the ground as opposed to what the GIRoA (Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan) may say is hap- pening. “Ground Truth” provides feedback to head- quarters level units (battle space owners) in charge of the area ANA and ANP.


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