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One Tribe at a Time

We helped the tribe with village projects whenever

we could. ODA 316 built this well for Dr. Ahkbar.

Even if the TTE strategy does not work on a large scale, wouldn’t 10 or 20 successes impact the overall COIN ght in Afghanistan? I believe the answer is yes. As a matter of fact, success in Mangwel is almost a guarantee if I can get there before Malik Noorafzhal passes away. He is 86 years old and time is ticking.

Now, as always, the enemy has a vote as well. As the TETs and the TSFs become more of a threat, the more the Taliban will increase the time, resources, capacity and will to destroy or at least disrupt their operation. is will increase the overall threat and in turn the violence directed at both TET and the tribe.

The risks of Tactical Tribal Engagement

Each TET tribe will become a target and will take casualties. e US Teams themselves will be targeted.

  • ere will be ghting. But the ghting will be US sol-

diers alongside tribesmen against a common enemy. Isn’t that what we want?

  • ere will also be “push-back” from assorted

Afghan ocials, powerbrokers, warlords, criminals, and some minority races in Afghanistan, as we would be arming and training a majority of Pashtun tribes.

How do we deal with competing tribes?

One of the keys here is to ensure that we tie what we are doing at the tactical level to regional and national representatives. Not coordinating our goals and operations with Afghanistan’s national political/ military elements only promotes a confusing and contentious relationship between the various govern- ment entities and the tribal system.


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