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One Tribe at a Time

Determine with the tribal leaders how many TSF (Arbakai) members they want, how many they need and what the TET can realistically support and train.

  • 3.

    Assessment and Build-up Phase (6 to 8 months): e TET begins to build a true relationship with the tribe by this time and can make a much better assessment of the ways and means of the tribe. Focus is on the training program for the TSF and security posture of the TET. is period will be the most dangerous for the TET as it will become apparent that the tribe is receiving outside support and becoming a threat to any enemy in the area. e threat to the tribe and the TET will increase in direct proportion to the success of the TET’s integration with the tribe.

  • 4.

    Expansion and Sustainment Phase (continuous, open-ended time frame): During this phase the biggest strides will be made by integrating the tribe into the local/district/regional and national government because they will be secure and, most importantly, they will feel respected and honored because the US has shown a clear commitment to them.

How to choose the right tribes to partner with? One good way is using “will” and “capacity” as benchmarks for initial screening. Some tribes have both the will and capacity to ght the Taliban. Other tribes have the will but not the capacity. Other tribes have the capacity and not the will.

What about the Tajiks, the Hazaras, and the Uzbeks?

Do we support some of those tribes as well? I believe we should.

  • ere is also the issue of key terrain located in a specic tribal area, and even areas the Taliban

may need for various reasons (opium, supply and inltration routes, etc.). e decision to support which tribe(s) would be an Afghan one. We (the US) also would need to put our own analysts and criteria to it to ensure that the right decisions were being made.

  • e method of performance (MOP) and the method of evaluation (MOE) criteria actually will

not be that dicult to determine for the TET. However, as the RAND study points out, “Eective analysis capability is a critical component of any capability. Counterinsurgency operations require the development of an analytical methodology to measure the insurgency’s impact on the local population—especially the impact of the security condition. Several factors can make it dicult to measure the eectiveness of counterinsurgency operations: Progress cannot be measured by the advance of militaries across a map as in conventional warfare; focusing only on guerrilla

  • ghters misses the broader support network; a complicated array of political, economic, social,

and military factors can fuel the insurgency; and there are rarely ideal predened qualitative or quantitative target metrics.” (Jones, Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan, p. 122)

Every day the Tribal Engagement Team will focus on security and quality of life issues

A major concern is initial security. is must be built from the inside out. Our inuence comes


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