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OBLIGATED ON THE DEBTS OWED TO WIFE, THEY [SIC] FAILED TO UNDERSTAND

AND APPRECIATE THE LANGUAGE IN THE SEPARATION AGREEMENT REQUIRING

SAID DEBT TO BE TREATED AS A DOMESTIC SUPPORT OBLIGATION AS DEFINED

BY 11 U.S.C.A. § 523(a)(5).”

{¶ 32}

Section

2.1

of

the

Separation

Agreement

that

was

incorporated into the decree classifies the obligations it imposed

on

Plez

as

a

“domestic

support

obligation,”

and

provides:

“In

the event Husband files bankruptcy, the Common Pleas Court of Miami

County, Ohio shall retain jurisdiction to order and/or modify

spousal

support.”

Plez

argues

that

“[t]he

trial

court

has

erred

by rendering judgment against [him] on [Lynn’s] motion for contempt

when the proper remedy according to the plain language of the

Separation Agreement was to come back to court to treat any unpaid

debts as a domestic support obligation.”

{¶ 33} Plez asserts that he has filed a petition in bankruptcy.

However, Section 2.1 does not limit Lynn’s remedy in that event

to obtaining a “domestic support obligation” order instead of

filing

charges

in

contempt.

Neither

does

Plez

explain

how

he

was

prejudiced because Lynn filed charges in contempt instead of

seeking

a

domestic

support

obligation

order.

Indeed,

if

that

alternative would confer a benefit on Plez, it was his duty to

seek that relief to obtain the benefit, an alternative which Section

2.1 makes available to both parties.

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