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of divorce is a judgment of the court.

{¶ 20} The parties’ Separation Agreement incorporated into the

decree required Lynn to convey her title to the Huntsville property

to Plez “[u]pon the release of [Lynn] from liability for all joint

debts listed below, and the payment to [Lynn] of $8000.”

The $8,000

payment was separately identified as “reimburse[ment] for her

original down-payment on the [Huntsville property],” and an

obligation which Plez agreed to pay.

{¶ 21} The trial court found Plez in contempt for failing to

pay

Lynn

the

$8,000

he

was

ordered to

pay

her.

On that same

basis,

the court declined to find Lynn in contempt for failing to convey

her title to the Huntsville property, reasoning that Plez’s prior

failure relieved Lynn of that duty.

{¶ 22} Plez argues that the court failed to appreciate the

nature of the third-party sale for which the decree provides.

Without saying so directly, Plez implies that the court should

have understood that the $8,000 payment to Lynn he was ordered

to make would, like the payments for the debts he promised to make

to their creditors, necessarily come from monies generated from

the refinancing Kappeler promised to undertake after Lynn’s title

to

the

property

was

transferred

from

Plez

to

Kappeler.

Such

third-party sales are common, according to Plez, and to accomplish

the

sale,

“[s]omebody

had

to

be

first.”

(Brief,

p.

16.)

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