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{¶ 23} We cannot find that the trial court failed to understand

the

nature

of

the

transaction.

The

trial

court

merely

construed

the terms of its decree and found that, as between Plez and Lynn,

it

was

Plez

who

had

to

be

the

first

to

act.

The

source

of

the

difficulties that occurred following the decree of divorce is

instead the trial court’s failure to comply with R.C. 3105.171(B).

That section provides that in divorce proceedings “the court shall

divide the marital and separate property equitably between the

parties.”

The

court

failed

to

do

that

with

respect

to

the

Huntsville property, instead permitting Lynn to retain title to

the property, subject to two post-decree contingencies.

{¶ 24} Lynn was required to convey her title “[u]pon the release

of [Lynn] from liability for all joint debts listed below, and

the

payment

to

[Lynn]

of

$8,000.”

As

it

is

used

in

Section

2.1,

the

word

“upon”

means

“on

the

condition

of.”

Webster’s

Third

New

International

Dictionary.

Plez’s

payment

of

$8,000

to

Lynn

was

a condition precedent to Lynn’s duty to convey her interest in

the

Huntsville

property.

Plez’s

failure

to

make

the

payment

relieved Lynn of her duty and prevented a finding of contempt on

her

part

pursuant

to

R.C.

2705.02(A).

Plez’s

failure

was

itself

a form of disobedience or resistance to the court’s lawful order,

from

which

the

court

could

reasonably

find

him

in

contempt.

Id.

{¶ 25} With respect to both the joint debts and the $8,000

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