NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW
carriers, the Navy still has to develop destroyers and escort ships in order to make up a mobile force at sea. If aircraft carriers are developed, these ships can serve as escorts for the aircraft carriers and also as mobile combat vessels.” Ibid., p. 480.
88. The Chinese colloquial abbreviation for aircraft carrier, hangmu, is also used extensively to de- scribe flagship enterprises and other great
achievements. See, for example,
[Build Up the Aircraft Carrier of the Manga- nese Industry and Make the Manganese Indus-
Industry] 23, no. 3 (August 2005), pp. 54–55. For use of the term “aircraft carrier” meta- phorically to describe a space station, see
[Lu Tiankuang], “ [Space Weapons: Occupying Commanding
ence & Technology], 2003), p. 56. For use of the term “aircraft carrier” to symbolize an educa-
tional institution, see
[Challenges and Answers: A Century of Chi- nese Educational Transformation], (
[Fujian Education], 2001), p. 96. These examples suggest a larger Chinese penchant for metaphorical writing that makes literal inter- pretation of interesting rumors problematic.
89. Authors’ interview, Beijing, June 2006.
. [Christie Manbar (as
transliterated), France, trans. and ed. Dan Jie],
” [China’s Early
Stage Conception of Aircraft Carrier(s)],
[Shipborne Weapons] (July 2005), pp. 18–21. For an article documenting a PLAN of- ficer’s attendance at a five-day exercise on the
Charles de Gaulle, see
“‘ ’ ‘Charles de Gaulle’],
” [I Set Sail with the [Naval & Mer-
chant Ships] (November 2005), pp. 18–22.
91. For a Chinese analysis of the British ASW heli-
copter carrier HMS Invincible (R05), see
[Complete Guide to Weapons: England],
[Guangxi People’s Press],
2003), p. 74.
[Yin Ling], “
[The Outlook for a Chinese Helicopter Carrier], [Shipborne Weapons] (August 2005), pp. 43–49.
See Chinese Defence Today, at sinodefence.com/ airforce/helicopter/z9c.asp and sinodefence .com/airforce/helicopter/ka28.asp.
“WZ-10 Attack Helicopter,” Chinese Defence Today, www.sinodefence.com/airforce/ helicopter/wz10.asp.
: [Flying toward the Ocean: The
Development and Problems of the PLAN’s Ship-
Weapons], no. 7 (July 2005), p. 30.
96. A third PLAN development trend has been care- ful consideration of the political impact of its development and deployment activities. China’s leaders took great pains to characterize their successful detonation of an atomic bomb in 1964 as “prevention of nuclear blackmail” and the liberation of other developing nations by breaking a “superpower monopoly.” In sharp contrast to Soviet expansionism, Chinese leaders insisted, China’s military development was in- herently defensive. Beijing went so far as to de- scribe the 1978 invasion of Vietnam as a “defensive counterattack.” As China has grown more powerful in recent years, Beijing has char- acterized its rapid military development as a “peaceful rise” designed merely to restore China to its former position of benevolent greatness. Even that slogan was recently deemed too pro- vocative; it was replaced with the concept of “peaceful development.”
97. See, for example,
[Lin Changsheng], “ ” [The
Hidden Dragon in the Deep: The Present Situa- tion and Development of PLA Mine Weaponry],
[World Outlook], no. 9 (May 2005), p. 22.
For acknowledgement of this issue, and a claim that it will not stop China from refitting the Varyag as an operational aircraft carrier, see “First Aircraft Carrier in Service Three Years from Now,” Tung Chou Kan, no. 135, 28 March 2006, pp. 54–56, FBIS CPP20060403510006.
Liu Huaqing, Memoirs of Liu Huaqing, p. 479.
100. For an example of this differentiation, see Wu Hongmin, “Dragon Swims the Five Seas,” pp.
12–21. 101. See (all in
[Yu Zhangcai and Li Huiyong], “
” [A Gleaming