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The rules governing promotion make it hard for a good manager to move up faster than a poor one.

The formal pay structures and rules make it hard to reward a good manager with higher pay here.

The personnel rules and procedures that govern my organization make it easy for superiors to reward subordinates for good performance. (scale reversed)

The Chronbach’s alpha for the scale is 0.69, indicating reliability of borderline acceptability.

Model and Results Six ordinary least squares regression models are performed to test the relationship between organization control, perceived red tape, and alienation. The models employ three alienation indicators and the two red tape measures (for organizational and personnel red tape). The centralization, formalization, and technology routineness measures remain constant across the six models.

Because the model residuals display heteroskedasticity, statistical tests are based on White’s heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. Slight departures from normality preclude the need to explore nonlinear modeling technologies, since ordinary least squares regression is robust against slight departures from normality (). Furthermore, variance inflation factor tests fail to generate evidence of multicollinearity between the model variables.1

In the first model (Table I), centralization and organizational red tape are associated with significantly lower organization commitment, as predicted. Formalization and technology routineness are insignificant model influences (p>0.10). An examination of standardized regression coefficients reveals that centralization has a stronger influence on commitment than does organizational red tape. Centralization is also more statistically influential than global red tape (p<0.01 versus p<0.05 for one tailed test). The model explains 17 percent of the variation in organization commitment.

1 No VIF score exceeds 1.5, well below the score of 5 that would trigger multicollinearity concerns (Berk, 2003).

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