observe defendant’s lack of a visible reaction. The jury, again, could reasonably credit Haney’s recollection of this event over Lara’s and defendant’s. This court cannot reweigh such questions of credibility.
The two cases defendant cites as similar to his, People v. Trevino (1985) 39 Cal.3d 667 and People v. Blakeslee (1969) 2 Cal.App.3d 831, are readily distinguishable. In People v. Trevino, there was no evidence of a motive for murder on the part of the defendant (Rivas), who was a friend of the victim; the conviction rested entirely on an equivocal eyewitness identification and a fingerprint from the defendant in the victim’s apartment, where he had previously been a guest. (Trevino, supra, at pp. 676, 696-697.) Here, the evidence of motive was strong, there was no innocent explanation for the presence of the pharmacy telephone number in defendant’s notebook, and defendant’s explanation of his fingerprint on the bubble shield was contradicted by several prosecution witnesses.
In People v. Blakeslee, the evidence established only that the defendant and her brother had both quarreled with the victim, who was their mother (the brother having done so on the night of the killing), that both had access to a rifle (belonging to the brother), and that the defendant had offered police a false account of her movements (intended, she testified, to protect the brother). The evidence was thus at least as consistent with the brother’s guilt as with the defendant’s. (Blakeslee, supra, 2 Cal.App.3d at pp. 837-840.) Here, defendant had a virtually unique combination of motive and opportunity to kill Koll and was connected by other circumstantial evidence (the notebook and fingerprint, and ownership of a blue helmet and smoky bubble shield) to the crime.
A reasonable jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that the circumstantial evidence proved defendant’s guilt.