discretion over continuances so as to deprive the defendant or his attorneys of a reasonable opportunity to prepare (People v. Sakarias (2000) 22 Cal.4th 596, 646; People v. Fudge (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1075, 1107), the court’s rulings in this case had no such effect.
Defendant complains of the trial court’s treatment of defense motions for continuance on four occasions before, during and after trial. We consider each occasion separately.
A. Pretrial continuance denied March 27, 1990
This court’s remittitur, upon reversal of defendant’s first conviction, was filed in the superior court on January 26, 1988, and the matter was placed on calendar for March 7, 1988. On that date, the court reappointed Halvor Miller and Elizabeth Harris, defendant’s attorneys in the first trial, to represent him on retrial. The case was continued to March 30 for pretrial conference. On March 30, Ms. Harris was relieved, and H. Clay Jacke was appointed as Miller’s cocounsel. The next day, at defense request, the case was continued to April 18 for further pretrial proceedings.
On April 18, 1988, the parties made their first appearance before the Honorable Jack Tso, who would be the trial judge. Judge Tso indicated he was in trial on another capital case and would not be available until the end of May. Defendant made his Faretta motion, which was withdrawn on April 22 as discussed ante, in part II, and, with the agreement of both parties, the court set a pretrial conference date of June 24. On June 10, June 24, July 22, August 19, and September 9, 1988, various defense motions were made and heard. On September 9, the court denied defendant’s motion to recuse the district attorney’s office and, with the agreement of both parties, set a further pretrial/trial setting conference for December 13, 1988, anticipating that jury voir dire would begin early in January