reasonable continuance would allow the defense to obtain records tending to show that the police officers’ testimony about finding the bubble shield was false and that the shield actually had been obtained from some accident scene. There was no good cause to continue the modification and sentencing hearing.
IV. Appearance of Judicial Bias
Defendant contends that the trial court’s hostile and disparaging comments during trial exhibited such a degree of bias against defense counsel, and so interfered with counsel’s examination of witnesses, as to deprive defendant of a fair trial, the effective assistance of counsel, and a reliable penalty determination. We disagree. First, because counsel failed to object to, or seek a jury admonition regarding, any of the instances of alleged judicial intemperance, the issue is waived on appeal. (People v. Fudge, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 1108; People v. Wright (1990) 52 Cal.3d 367, 411.) Moreover, the claim is without merit; though the trial judge, the Honorable Jack Tso, was sometimes impatient with the attorneys for both parties, and though a few of his exchanges with defense counsel were especially contentious, neither separately nor together do these instances of harsh language amount to an unconstitutional display of judicial bias.
Although the trial court has both the duty and the discretion to control the conduct of the trial (People v. Fudge, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 1108), the court “commits misconduct if it persistently makes discourteous and disparaging remarks to defense counsel so as to discredit the defense or create the impression it is allying itself with the prosecution” (People v. Carpenter (1997) 15 Cal.4th 312, 353). Nevertheless, “[i]t is well within [a trial court’s] discretion to rebuke an attorney, sometimes harshly, when that attorney asks inappropriate questions, ignores the court’s instructions, or otherwise engages in improper or delaying behavior.” (United States v. Donato (D.C. Cir. 1996) 99 F.3d 426, 434.) Indeed,