satisfy only the first part of the two-part test outlined in Eubanks and Hambarian. The trial court correctly refused to recuse the district attorney’s office without a showing that prosecution by that office would render fair treatment unlikely. (Hambarian, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 833.)12
As defendant does not contend the trial court’s ruling was an abuse of discretion (see Eubanks, supra, 14 Cal.4th at pp. 594-595) under what we have explained is the correct legal standard, we need not decide that question. We note, however, that recusal of an entire district attorney’s office, especially a large one such as Los Angeles County’s, has generally not been held required merely because one or more employees of that office are witnesses in the case. (See People v. Hernandez (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 674, 678; Trujillo v. Superior Court (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 368, 370, 373; People ex rel. Younger v. Superior Court (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 180, 191-192, 205-212.)
IX. Admission of Assertedly Privileged Communication
Defendant claims error in the admission, over defense objection, of evidence that defendant had asked to delay his response to the robbery plea bargain offer until after the lunch hour. Because the communication to his attorney of this request was privileged, he contends, its admission denied him due process and a fair trial.
Gerald Hanley, the deputy district attorney who prosecuted defendant for the robbery of Koll’s pharmacy, testified that on the morning of November 3,
12 Defendant also asserts that denial of the recusal motion deprived him of a fair trial (U.S. Const., 14th Amend.) and a reliable penalty determination (id., 8th Amend.), as well as constituting error under section 1424. As defendant nowhere articulates how, if at all, the relevant constitutional principles differ from the statutory standard, we discuss only the legal standard set out in section 1424. (See Hambarian, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 833, fn. 4; Eubanks, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 596, fn. 8.)