1980, he and Adolfo Lara, defendant’s attorney, were in plea negotiations in the trial judge’s chambers. Hanley made an offer, which Lara left to discuss with defendant. Over defense objection, Hanley testified that when Lara returned he told Hanley, “ ‘My guy wants to think about it over—during the lunch hour.’ ”
Defendant’s statement to Lara was not a confidential communication, within the meaning of Evidence Code section 952, because, by its nature, it was meant to be communicated by the attorney to the prosecutor. Thus, it was not privileged. (Solon v. Lichtenstein (1952) 39 Cal.2d 75, 79-80; 2 Witkin, Cal. Evidence (4th ed. 2000) Witnesses, § 119, p. 375.) Defendant’s constitutional contention, which depends on his claim of privilege, fails as well.
X. Failure to Admit Expert Testimony or Provide Instructions on Eyewitness Identification
The trial court excluded, as irrelevant, the defense’s proffered expert testimony on the factors affecting the reliability of eyewitness identifications. The court also gave no jury instructions on this subject. Defendant contends that exclusion of the evidence and the court’s failure, sua sponte, to instruct on this topic were error.
No eyewitness identified defendant as the person who shot and killed Koll. Testifying at the preliminary hearing in the prior robbery case, however, Koll had identified defendant as one of the robbers. The expectation that Koll would again so testify at the robbery trial provided, according to the prosecution theory of this murder case, the motive for defendant to kill Koll. Defendant’s knowledge of that likelihood, and his understanding of the strength or weakness of that expected identification, were clearly relevant to motive; indeed, defense evidence going to these points was admitted. (See ante, at pp. 9, 12.) But a psychologist’s testimony regarding the factors generally affecting the reliability of eyewitness identifications did not, in itself, have any tendency to show defendant’s motive