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Rodrigues (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1060, 1184-1186; People v. Bonin (1988) 46 Cal.3d 659, 694-695, overruled on other grounds in People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 823, fn. 1.)

Nor do we decide whether counsel’s guilt phase argument was, taken as a whole, constitutionally inadequate, a point disputed by the parties on appeal.  Though Miller did not address the handwriting evidence in his resumed argument, that may well have been a tactical decision.  Even if the prosecution expert’s testimony were successfully attacked, the spiral-bound notebook remained linked to defendant because it was found in his automobile.  The defense, as the Attorney General points out, may have decided that as to this topic “the less said, the better.”  In these circumstances, where the appellate record does not reveal whether counsel had a legitimate reason for a litigation choice, we generally reserve consideration of any ineffective assistance claim for possible proceedings on petition for writ of habeas corpus.  (People v. Lewis (2001) 25 Cal.4th 610, 674-675; People v. Mendoza Tello (1997) 15 Cal.4th 264, 266-267.)

XVII.  Standard Instructions on Circumstantial Evidence

Defendant attacks four standard instructions given in his case, CALJIC Nos. 2.01, 2.02, 8.83, and 8.83.1, each of which contains language advising the jury that if faced with two possible interpretations of the evidence, one reasonable and one unreasonable, “you must accept the reasonable interpretation and reject the unreasonable.”  According to defendant each of these was constitutionally flawed because each “sanctioned a permissive inference or factual finding against

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