exists. (People v. Frye, supra, at p. 958.) Taking all the instructions together, as required, the jurors would instead have understood that while the issue before them is defendant’s guilt or innocence, a conviction may be returned only if the prosecution has proved defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Because there was no reasonable likelihood of misunderstanding, the challenged instructions did not deprive defendant of a fair trial or a reliable penalty determination.
XX. Instruction on Motive
Defendant complains that CALJIC No. 2.51, which, as given, stated that motive “is not an element of the crime charged and need not be shown,” but that its presence “may tend to establish guilt,” did not further caution the jury that proof of motive alone was insufficient to establish guilt.
If the challenged instruction somehow suggested that motive alone was sufficient to establish guilt, defendant’s point might have merit. But in fact the instruction tells the jury that motive is not an element of the crime charged (murder) and need not be shown, which leaves little conceptual room for the idea that motive could establish all the elements of murder. When CALJIC No. 2.51 is taken together with the instruction on the concurrence of act and specific intent (CALJIC No. 3.31) and the instruction outlining the elements of murder and requiring each of them to be proved in order to prove the crime (CALJIC No. 8.10), there is no reasonable likelihood (People v. Frye, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 958) it would be read as suggesting that proof of motive alone may establish guilt of murder.
XXI. Instructions on Motive and the Special Circumstance Allegation
Defendant contends that CALJIC No. 2.51, discussed above, and CALJIC No. 8.81.10, which, as given, told the jury that one element of the charged