weight you deem appropriate.”
Defendant contends the court’s modification diluted the instruction on lingering doubt in violation of the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. We disagree. Though we have characterized the omitted second sentence of the defense proposal favorably as a “straightforward instruction” (People v. Morris (1991) 53 Cal.3d 152, 219), we have never suggested that it was required in every, or any, case. The remaining portions adequately convey the concept of lingering doubt and its proper relevance to the penalty decision. Nor does defendant cite any decision holding that a juror’s lingering doubt “must,” as opposed to “may,” be considered in mitigation. (See Tuilaepa v. California (1994) 512 U.S. 967, 979 [“A capital sentencer need not be instructed how to weigh any particular fact in the capital sentencing decision”].)
XXVII. Constitutional Challenges to California’s Death Penalty Law
Defendant contends that the 1978 death penalty scheme violates the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution in several respects.
As defendant concedes, we have previously rejected many of his claims in this regard. Thus, we have held:
The special circumstances listed in section 190.2 adequately narrow the class of murders for which the death penalty may be imposed. (People v. Anderson, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 601; People v. Ochoa (1998) 19 Cal.4th 353, 479; People v. Frye, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 1029.)
The statute is not invalid for failing to require (1) written findings or unanimity as to aggravating factors, (2) proof of all aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt, (3) findings that aggravation outweighs mitigation beyond a reasonable doubt, or (4) findings that death is the appropriate penalty beyond