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The indicators are based on the hypothesis that the customers are known to the intermediary, independently of the distribution channels used (branch offices, financial salesmen, insurance salesmen, telephonic or electronic channels, etc.).

As regards suspicious transactions with a tax dimension, it is necessary to bear in mind the recent changes to the penal aspects of tax law. In fact, for there to be a suspected penal offence in connection with tax returns, it would be necessary to know not only the undeclared amounts but also the subjective situation of the customer in order to “reconstruct” the amount of tax evaded, or to have learnt of the inclusion of false invoices in a return. On the other hand, issuing invoices or other documents for partly or totally non-existent transactions is considered to be an offence regardless of the amount involved. In this case it is necessary, in evaluating the grounds for suspicion, to consider that the issue of such documents, apart from being rated a particularly serious offence, can also be a means of hiding other criminal actions.

Where transactions are requested by occasional customers, the evaluation — in the event that the information on the person’s income-earning capacity and activity is inadequate — must focus primarily on the technical features of the transaction and, in particular, on its size.

At the time a business relationship is first established with a customer, the intermediary must adopt a more cautious attitude. Where the telephonic or electronic channel is used, a significant factor is the way in which funds are first transmitted; where there are large transactions without adequate information, the intermediary may even decline to carry them out.

Where, even though a transaction is not carried out, an intermediary has found significant suspicious elements, it must submit a report.

1. Anomaly indicators for all categories of transactions

1.1 Repeated transactions of the same kind not justified by the customer’s activity carried out in a way that suggests the intention to dissimulate:

frequent inflows of funds that are transferred after a short interval in ways or to destinations unrelated to the customer’s normal activity, especially if the origin or destination is abroad;

inflows in the form of instruments (cash, credit instruments, credit transfers) that do not appear consistent with the customer’s activity.

1.2 Recourse to techniques for splitting up transactions, especially where this serves to circumvent identification and registration obligations:

frequent transactions for amounts just below the registration threshold, especially if in cash or via a plurality of other intermediaries, where this is not justified by the customer’s activity;

the opening of several bearer bank or post office deposit books or other equivalent securities for amounts just below the registration threshold;

withdrawals of large sums by means of unmotivated requests for cashier’s checks for amounts just below the registration threshold;

liquidation of contracts involving financial instruments or insurance policies with requests for settlement in cash or the splitting up of the total amount into numerous credit instruments;

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