X hits on this document

PDF document

[Cite as Meyer v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 122 Ohio St.3d 104, 2009-Ohio-2463.] - page 10 / 23





10 / 23


{¶ 27} The concurring opinion in Cosgrove observed that “R.C. 4112.99 functions as a gap-filling provision, establishing civil liability for violations of rights for which no other provision for civil liability has been made.” Id., 70 Ohio St.3d at 292, 638 N.E.2d 991.8

  • III.


    • A.

      Structure of R.C. Chapter 4112 for age-discrimination claims

{¶ 28} A consideration of the foregoing authorities yields several conclusions regarding R.C. Chapter 4112 directly relevant to this case. Because age-discrimination claims are specifically addressed in R.C. Chapter 4112, it necessarily follows from Elek, Bellian, and Cosgrove that age-discrimination claims are not governed by the general gap-filling provisions of R.C. 4112.99. Rather, they are covered by the statutes in R.C. Chapter 4112 that are specific to age discrimination. The Cosgrove concurrence cogently explains why this result obtains, and it is fully consistent with Elek and Bellian.

{¶ 29} Furthermore, contrary to Meyer’s arguments, the fact that R.C. 4112.14 was not in R.C. Chapter 4112 when Elek, Bellian, and Cosgrove were decided is of no significance. The general accuracy of the reasoning of the Cosgrove concurrence remains sound. R.C. 4112.99 continues to function as a gap filler. Even if an age-discrimination claim is filed solely pursuant to R.C.

8. Perhaps in response to the suggestion of the concurring opinion in Cosgrove that the General Assembly should expressly designate statutes of limitations for claims brought under R.C. Chapter 4112, see 70 Ohio St.3d at 293, 638 N.E.2d 991 (Resnick, J., concurring, joined by Moyer, C.J., and A.W. Sweeney, Douglas, and Wright, JJ.), the General Assembly attempted to establish a two- year statute of limitations for all employment-discrimination claims by amending R.C. 4112.02(N), 4112.14(B), and 4112.99 in 1996 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 350, 146 Ohio Laws, Part II, 3867, 4004, 4006-4007, to be effective January 27, 1997. However, in State ex rel. Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 451, 715 N.E.2d 1062, paragraphs two and three of the syllabus, this court held House Bill 350 unconstitutional in its entirety for violating the Ohio constitutional doctrine of separation of powers and the one-subject provision of the Ohio Constitution. As a result, those amendments were invalidated. The General Assembly revived the prior versions of those statutes in 2001 Sub.S.B. No. 108, 149 Ohio Laws, Part I, 382, 481, 484- 485, effective July 6, 2001, and repealed the versions held invalid in Sheward without reenacting


Document info
Document views70
Page views70
Page last viewedSun Dec 11 06:39:24 UTC 2016