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[Cite as Meyer v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 122 Ohio St.3d 104, 2009-Ohio-2463.] - page 15 / 23





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January Term, 2009

pursue all remedies specifically delineated within the chapter. However, as we have explained above, the source of those remedies for age discrimination is the substantive provisions of R.C. 4112.02 and 4112.14; it is not R.C. 4112.99, even though a plaintiff can file under that statute. See Leininger at ¶ 14, stating that with the incorporation of former R.C. 4101.17 into R.C. Chapter 4112 as R.C.

    • 4112.14

      , additional “remedies are available to plaintiffs * * * pursuant to R.C.

    • 4112.99.

{¶ 39} The court of appeals was mistaken when it read our mention of Elek in the quoted passage from Leininger as reiterating the “prior holding that had rejected the argument that the specific-remedies provisions of subsections within the chapter prevail over the more general provisions of R.C. 4112.99.” 174 Ohio App.3d 339, 2007-Ohio-7063, 882 N.E.2d 31, ¶ 24. In Leininger, this

court was not citing Elek for such a broad principle as to age-discrimination claims but was merely noting that at the time an age-discrimination claim accrues, full remedies are available. To the extent that dicta in Leininger might give rise to the impression that Elek is the primary controlling authority for age- discrimination claims, we reject that interpretation.

{¶ 40} We emphasize that all age-discrimination employment-related claims must be governed by the specific statutory directives in R.C. Chapter 4112, and Leininger should not be read as indicating otherwise. To read Leininger out of context the way the court of appeals did elevates R.C. 4112.99 beyond its possible reach for age-discrimination claims, makes irrelevant the specific age- discrimination statutes in R.C. Chapter 4112, and ignores our prior case law, which retains its relevance regarding current R.C. Chapter 4112, as established above.

C. R.C. 4112.14(C) {¶ 41} The dispositive issue in this case is whether Meyer’s age- discrimination claim is barred by R.C. 4112.14(C). It provides:


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