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Figure 31.

Transportation Pipeline and Responsibility (After MRAP JPO, 2008, October 21)

When the MRAP production rate surpassed the TRANSCOM airlift limit of 380 vehicles per-month, the JPO moved to surface-shipping as the primary means of transportation to Iraq. With the ability to transport up to 500 vehicles per-ship, and production rates exceeding 1000 per-month by early 2008, vehicle flow eventually exceeded both the 250 vehicle per-week de-processing capability in Kuwait, as well as the ability of units to receive vehicles given ongoing combat operations. As the queue filled at multiple sites in Kuwait and Iraq, the program shifted entirely to ship-borne transportation by May 2008. MRAPs bound for Afghanistan, however, must still be airlifted because of that country’s landlocked and remote location (Hansen, 2008, June

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    Transportation Cost Oversight

Transportation was one of the most significant cost elements for the MRAP program; therefore, the mode of transportation was a significant concern for the JPO. At

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