Secretary Gates making the MRAP the top DoD acquisition priority, no consensus existed within the user community, and particularly within the Army, over the best way of addressing the IED threat. Since the program start, however, MRAPs have gained widespread user acceptance, although
with recognition of the limits based on size and maneuverability. acceptance, therefore, conforms to prior research from the perspective of warfighters have used the MRAP. It does not, however, indicate that acceptance is critical at program start.
This how user
Perhaps more than any other factor, the MRAP program
of leadership acceptance in the success of a Even after the initial JUONS validation in
demonstrates the rapid acquisition December 2006,
consensus did not exist in the user community that MRAP offered the best solution to the IED
or the threat.
senior DoD leadership Through the spring of
MRAP was still largely a Marine Corps initiative. When Secretary prioritized the program first among all DoD programs, however, he
effectively established leadership acceptance and a broad mandate program. From that point on, the program commanded the priority of every level within the DoD. This indicates that leadership acceptance program success more than any other factor, and largely influenced acceptance that followed.
for the effort at enabled the user
The final condition, a dedicated funding source, is critical for any acquisition program regardless of whether it is rapid or standard in nature. The urgent need and scale of the program with requirements exceeding $22 billion precluded funding through the standard PPBES process. Its priority and backing within the DoD and Congress enabled it to receive sufficient funding through reprogrammed funds, and emergency and supplemental appropriations. The MRAP program conforms to prior research in that it required money through non-standard sources. The tremendous political support ensured the program had relatively little resistance in obtaining those funds.