Office (GAO) and other government reports, academic and research papers, and information provided by the program office. The analysis also includes interviews with the Program Manager (PM) and others from the Joint Program Office (JPO), key program participants from DCMA, the Commander of Aberdeen Test Center (ATC), senior officials at Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command (SPAWAR) involved in the integration effort, and interviews with senior managers for two MRAP producers and one major subcontractor to the effort.
LIMITATIONS OF RESEARCH
This research identifies the key aspects of the MRAP program that contributed to its success. It does not, however, identify every factor that contributed to the program; therefore, it is not a comprehensive overview of the program from the perspective of all stakeholders. For example, the research does not include feedback from users in Iraq and
Afghanistan, and it
draws on addition,
visits and interviews with only this research does not provide
of the five
program’s largest customer, the U.S. Army.2 Finally, considering the unique large scale of this program, this report does not provide a comprehensive view defense acquisitions.3
nature and of all rapid
2 Numerous unsuccessful attempts were made to interview MRAP program representatives at the U.S.
Army Tank-Automotive and Armament Command (TACOM).
3 The majority of acquisition programs considered rapid are much smaller in scale [Acquisition
Category (ACAT) II—IV] and do not have the same political or senior DoD level emphasis. 3