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As a result of combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq [Operations Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Iraqi Freedom (OIF)], warfighters identified a need for a series of vehicles designed to survive the catastrophic threats posed by the Improvised Explosive Device (IED), as well as from conventional mine and ambush tactics. These vehicles were collectively described as MRAP capable and would be specifically built to defeat these threats.

The MRAP vehicle’s success at protecting its passengers was widely known prior to the 1990s but only recently recognized by the United States DoD. The DoD first tested the MRAP in FY 2000. Following testing, the Army purchased an additional 10 vehicles for contingency purposes that were subsequently used in the Global War on Terror, primarily by EOD teams. These vehicles were the Joint Explosive Ordnance Disposal Rapid Response Vehicle (JERRV) and the Buffalo, both manufactured by Force Protection Industries, Incorporated (FPII) (Inspector General, 2007, pp. 4-7). Given the success of these vehicles against IEDs, the DoD quickly recognized them as an effective materiel solution.

Warfighters initially requested MRAPs as early as 2003. However, due to time, budgetary considerations, and the general optimism and belief in a short conflict in Iraq, senior defense officials focused their efforts on up-armored HMMWVs and other anti- IED efforts such as bolt-on armor kits. As the conflict progressed and the enemy shifted tactics from road-side bombs to buried, under-body attacks, it became apparent that up- armored HMMWVs did not provide the necessary level of protection (Hansen, 2008, June 10). MRAP requests increased, and in late 2006, the Joint Requirements Oversight

Council proposal

(JROC) (RFP)

validated a requirement for for the MRAP was released

1,185 vehicles. The first request November 9, 2006, and the JPO

for was

subsequently established December 6, Corps’ lead in the program, the JPO Command (MARCORSYSCOM), and

2006 (Mann, 2008, Slide 4). Given the Marine was established within Marine Corps Systems Mr. Paul Mann was transferred from Naval Sea

Systems (ACAT)

Command to serve as the PM. Although III program, it received high level attention

initially an Acquisition from the start with the

Category Assistant

7

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