threats. The ‘expanded use’ of roadside bombs, rocket propelled grenades, and small arms fire in Al Anbar province requires a more robust family of vehicles” (Sherman & Castelli, 2007). His request went unfilled for four months, and the issue surfaced again in a June 10, 2005, status report indicating that the Marine Corps was holding out for a “future vehicle,” presumably the JLTV—more mobile than the MRAP, but more protective than the HMMWV. This vehicle was not expected to be available, however, until 2012 (Eisler, Moorison, & Vanden Brook, 2007).
In May and July 2006, the Multi-National Forces West (MNF-W) Commander in Iraq submitted urgent universal need statement (UUNS) requests for 185 and then an additional 1,000 vehicles. Those requests were combined and designated as a Joint Urgent Operational Needs Statement (JUONS) by the Central Command (CENTCOM)
commander in October 2006. MARCORSYSCOM released the
After the JROC validated that initial RFP on November 9, and the
request, JPO was
established within MARCORSYSCOM the early uncertainty in the program,
shortly thereafter the initial 1,185
on December 6. To illustrate requirement grew to 15,374
Commandant, James requirement” (Eisler, Defense, Mr. Robert
Conway, called the vehicle his “Number 1 unfulfilled warfighting Moorison, & Vanden Brook, 2007). In May 2007, the Secretary of Gates, made MRAP the top DoD acquisition priority. In addition,
acquisition programs) in June 2007, and by September designated an ACAT 1D Program, placing oversight in Secretary of Defense (OSD) (Miles, 2007).
of that year,
the hands of
program was Office of the
The source selection process resulted in the procurement of MRAP vehicles from five different manufacturers: BAE Systems (BAE); Armor Holdings (AH) (now owned by BAE Systems); General Dynamics Land Systems (GDLS); Force Protection Industries, Inc. (FPII); and Navistar’s International Military and Government, LLC subsidiary (IMG) (now called Navistar Defense). Although limited commonality exists