Program Executive Officer for Tactical missiles personally sponsored the program, funding it from within his own organization (pp. 55-60). As Jones pointed out, the PPBS (since renamed the PPBES for Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System) is not structured to rapidly fund WRAP programs (p. 57). This indicates that for rapid acquisition programs to be successful, they must acquire funding from a non- standard source such as reprogrammed funds or supplemental appropriations.
Jones also determined that the WRAP process cannot be applied to every
In summary, he concluded
that the WRAP
process can be
First, a working
solution must exist developmental item
that meets an urgent Army need using mature technology or such as a COTS solution. Second, the program must be small
a non- in size
and potentially allow for reprogramming of funds. supported by strong advocates from both the user
Third, the materiel solution and developer communities.
must be Fourth,
the program must utilize fixed-type price contracts and contract with key program or milestone events to spur contractors forward. must be low production quantity or exercise the use of exercisable means of building upon success (pp. 71-72).
incentives associated Finally, the program contract options as a
A Recent Case Study on an Accelerated Acquisition
In their 2005 MBA Professional Report, James Conatser and Vincent Grizio detailed the accelerated acquisition and deployment of the Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below—Blue Force Tracking (FBCB2-BFT) system in support of Operations Enduring and Iraqi Freedom. In simplified terms, this system provides an integrated, digital command and control capability across all battlefield functional areas and from the squad/platform to the brigade/regimental level (p. 9).
This program provides a different scenario for rapid acquisition in which the need was previously identified, a requirements document was already approved, and the system was progressing through the development process. In this case, the combination of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, along with capability demonstrated in limited user tests and advanced warfighting experiments, effectively made the capability an urgent