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On May 2, 2007, the JROC, chaired by Admiral Edmund Giambastiani, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, approved an MRAP Capability Production Document (CPD), formally setting the size of the required MRAP fleet at 7,774 vehicles. This approval, which precedes procurement actions for standard programs, came less than two months after the military Services detailed their collective need for MRAP vehicles, an extraordinarily rapid pace in formalizing a new need for a large weapon system program (Sherman, 2007, May 17). Even more extraordinary, however, was that at this point in the MRAP program, testing was underway for seven competing manufacturers and production contracts had already been awarded to five companies.

B.

PROGRAM STRATEGY

1.

Acquisition Strategy

The acquisition strategy was formed in support of three primary program objectives: first, field survivable, mission capable vehicles; second, field them as rapidly as possible; and third, grow the industrial base while simultaneously managing all aspects of the acquisition process. The PM considered all other factors trade-able in support of those objectives. The JPO planned to achieve this through parallel execution of as many elements of the acquisition framework as feasibly possible. Given the nature of the requirement and the dire need for a survivable system, the decision was made not to restrict innovation by demanding a single COTS solution, but to solicit industry and see what different solutions an expanded industrial base could provide (Hansen, 2008, May

30). To

incentivize

multiple

contracts

followed by

phased,

vendors, the rapid testing

strategy included use of multiple focused on threshold requirements.

IDIQ This

phased testing served as production orders. The

a form of source selection that led to rapid award of multiple use of multiple manufacturers required an intensive contractor

management effort and centralized integration without sustainment systems in place required approach (Owen, 2008, pp. 6-8).

process.

Finally, the

a

contractor

logistics

rapid fielding support (CLS)

26

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