X hits on this document

PDF document

MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA - page 87 / 153

356 views

0 shares

0 downloads

0 comments

87 / 153

the DoD, however, this spike in demand posed potential limits on production rates. These limits were in many cases unknown and dependent on how lower level suppliers would react to the increased demand for their products. Some of the resource constraints were identified or clarified through industrial surveys conducted by the Office of the Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Industrial Policy. These surveys helped to define production limits in steel and in the heavy tires needed for the vehicles (Hansen, 2008, May 30).

To mitigate these potential bottlenecks, three major prioritize and increase production of necessary components and

program.

First, on May 2, 2007,

Secretary

of

Defense

actions were taken to materials for the MRAP Robert Gates issued a

memorandum stating the following:

The MRAP program should be considered the highest priority Department of Defense acquisition program and any and all options to accelerate the production and fielding of this capability to the theater should be identified, assessed and applied where feasible. In this regard, I would

like to know what currently constrains them. This should authorities available 2008, p. 14)

funding, materiel, program, legal or other limits the program and the options available to overcome include an examination of all applicable statutory to the Secretary of Defense or the President. (Owen,

Concurrent with this memo, Secretary Gates directed the establishment of a DoD MRAP Task Force whose objective was to “get as many of these vehicles to our Soldiers and Marines in the field as is possible in the next several months” (Young et al., 2007, p. 2). Not only did this clearly establish the MRAP program as the top priority for all resources and effort within the DoD, the task force and its direct reporting line to the Secretary added an additional level of pressure to all program participants and stakeholders. In effect, the memorandum directed all officials involved in the program to identify any issues that might constrain the program and take action to mitigate them. One such example occurred on May 22, 2007, when Dr. Delores Etter, the Navy Acquisition Executive, approved an exception to Title 10 U.S. Code section 2533b, which “prohibits DoD from procuring end items, or components thereof, containing

65

Document info
Document views356
Page views356
Page last viewedTue Dec 06 10:16:54 UTC 2016
Pages153
Paragraphs3344
Words40255

Comments