contrary effects—implies no contradictions.
2.Demonstrative reasoning gives us conclusions
whose negations imply contradictions.
3.Thus, demonstrative reasoning is not the
foundation of conclusions from experience.
b.Moral Reasoning (i.e., “that concerning matter of fact
and existence”) is not the foundation of our conclusions from experience.
1.If every instance I of a type of argument T is
founded on the supposition that P is true, then no argument of type T can prove that P is true.
2.Every instance of moral reasoning is founded on
the supposition that the future will resemble the past or that causes that appear similar will cause similar effects.
3.Thus, no instance of moral reasoning can prove
that the future will resemble the past or that causes that appear similar will cause similar effects.
1.So what is the foundation of our conclusions from experience? Hume says that
the “principle is custom or habit.”
2.Hume says that “belief is nothing but a more vivid, lively, forcible, firm, steady
conception of an object, than what the imagination alone is ever able to attain.”
3.Cause and Effect is the only relation that can generate beliefs. Resemblance and
contiguity enliven ideas only when belief is already present.
1.Probability: When we notice that B follows A more often than C does, we are
moved by custom to believe that B will follow A (whenever we see A).
1.Where do we get our idea of Necessary Connection?
A.In answering this question, Hume applies his method: “To be fully
acquainted … with the idea of power or necessary connexion, let us examine its impression.”
B.According to Hume, we cannot find an impression of necessary
connection itself when “we look about us towards external objects.”
C.According to Hume, we cannot find an impression of necessary
connection itself when we look inward.
D.We get our idea of necessary connection from a connection that we feel in
the mind: Hume says that “after a repetition of similar instances, the mind is carried by habit, upon the appearance of one event, to expect its usual attendant, and to believe, that it will exist. This connexion, therefore, which we feel in the mind, this customary transition of the imagination from one object to its usual attendant, is the sentiment or impression, from which we form the idea of power or necessary connexion.”