Draft Chapter for Strategic Intelligence
failures to collect information on socio-economic, ideo-cultural, techno-demographic, or natural-geographic matters. This has been compounded by an extraordinary laziness or ignorance is relying almost exclusively on what can be stolen or obtained readily in English—the USA simply does not “do” the key 31 languages,22 much less the totality of 185 languages necessary to understand the sub-state threat and the global network of cause and effect.
2. . We have relied almost exclusively, at least in the USA, on “official cover” for our spies, and known trajectories for our satellites. Non-Official Cover (NOC), which does not offer any form of diplomatic or other official immunity from incarceration or eviction, has been treated as too expensive, too complicated, and not worthy of full development. The result has been the almost total compromise of all U.S. secret agents and case officers overseas, as well as their varied not-so-secret thefts of the codebooks of other nations. We not only don’t know what we don’t know, we are in denial about the basic fact that what we do know has been compromised.
3. . Finally, and this applies to both clandestine human collection and secret technical collection, we have failed, with deliberate ignorance at the management level, to devote any resources of significance to processing—to sense-making. Today, eighteen years after the needed functionalities for an all-source analytic desktop toolkit were published, we still do not have a desktop analytic toolkit. Today, despite major advances in the private sector with respect to machine-speed translation, and machine-speed statistical, pattern, and predictive analysis, the large majority of our classified
Version 2.4 dated 7 April 2006