Draft Chapter for Strategic Intelligence
provider with direct indigenous access, in the time and with the operational security (e.g. cover support plans) appropriate to the need. Only if the first three options are unsuited to the need should the collection manager be tasking secret sources and methods, and even that will have to change to accommodate new possibilities from multinational secret task forces able to leverage the collection capabilities of varied countries, many of them vastly superior to the USA when it comes to both deep cover clandestine human penetrations, and the related ability to place close-in secret technical collection devises.24
OSINT is, without question, the catalyst for a revolution in how we collect intelligence.
Apart from our failure to actually invest in processing (known within the US Intelligence Community as Tasking, Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination, or TPED), we have made three consistent mistakes over time that have made it virtually impossible, and now unaffordable, to actually do automated all-source analysis:
1. . We failed to establish data standards that could be used at the point of entry for both secret and open sources of information. This applies to both information sources, and information software. Not only was the intelligence community much to slow to adopt commons standards such as eXtended Markup Language (XML) Resource Description Framework (RDF), Web Ontology Language (OWL), Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP), today it is either ignorant of or reluctant to move ahead aggressively with Open Hypertextdocument System (OHS)25 and eXtended Markup Language Geospatial (XML Geo). The obsession with security, and the pathology of limiting contracts
Version 2.4 dated 7 April 2006