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Draft Chapter for Strategic Intelligence

security philosophy that has combined paranoia over foreign contacts (and relatives), with an unwillingness to spend the time and thoughtfulness necessary to clear complicated individuals that have led complicated lives.  This personnel management failure stems from the larger philosophical management failure, which confuses secrets with intelligence, and thus demeans expertise from the open source world while assuming that young analysts will succeed because they have access to secrets, rather than because of any application of analytic tradecraft such as might take twenty years to refine.

2.  Hard Target Focus.  In keeping with the military-industrial complex and its desire to profit from the Cold War, the national and military intelligence communities devoted virtually their entire budgets and most of their manpower to the “hard targets” (generally, Russia, China, Iran, India, Pakistan, Libya, and—hard to believe but true—Cuba).  They ignored all of the “lower tier” issues and Third World countries,29 and also focused only on very big threats, not on very big opportunities for peaceful preventive measures where a few dollars invested in the 1970’s might have eradicated Anti-Immune Deficiency Systems (AIDS) or dependency on Middle Eastern oil.  This was of course in keeping with policy preferences, and even when the CIA did excellent work (for example, accurately forecasting the global AIDS epidemic), it could safely be ignored because its work was not available to the public or even to most Members of Congress.  A very important consequence of this narrow focus was the complete failure to ensure that all of the sources of national power—diplomatic, informational, military, economic (DIME)—were funded, acquired, fielded, and applied in a

Version 2.4 dated 7 April 2006

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