Draft Chapter for Strategic Intelligence
coherent and timely manner. The entire military-industrial-intelligence complex has been skewed toward a heavy metal military—a few big platforms or big organizations—that are only relevant 10% of the time. We are completely unprepared for, we are not trained, equipped, or organized, for small wars, waging peace, or homeland defense. This is still true—truer that ever—in the aftermath of 9-11 and the invasions and occupations of Afghanistan and Iraq.
3. . Finally, U.S. Intelligence (and many foreign intelligence communities) focused on the local now instead of the global future. “Current Intelligence” dominated the President’s Daily Briefing (PDB), and over time longer-term research fell by the wayside. This problem was aggravated by a draconian editing process in both the national civilian and theater or service level military, where a twelve month research project could be subject to eighteen month editing cycles, such that the work was out of date or thoroughly corrupted by the time it was finally released to a relatively limited number of policymakers. With most of the intelligence products being released in hard-copy, or messages that were printed out and not saved electronically, the overall impact of U.S. intelligence production, and especially Codeword production, must be judged as marginal.30
OSINT is “the rival store.”31 Whereas I spent the first eighteen years of my campaign to foster an appreciation on OSINT and focusing on the urgency of integrating OSINT into secret sources toward improved all-source analysis, I plan to spend the next eighteen years burying 80% of the classified world. They are too expensive, too irrelevant, and pathologically anti-thetical to the new and correct Swedish concept of Multinational, Multiagency,
Version 2.4 dated 7 April 2006