Studies such as the one done on Political Tribalism4 confirm that corruption extends to the political administration where it saps the political will to treat effectively with the crime problem. There are now large groupings of key institutional actors who are the beneficiaries of this and its related problems. They have a vested interest in blocking the changes that are needed to ensure effective institutional responses to the crime problem. Any effort at improving the effectiveness of the institutions of crime control will therefore sooner or later collide with institutionalized corruption.
1.1.4. The situation requires a sense of urgency, focus and seriousness of purpose. Crime, especially violent crime, presents a challenge to leadership at the level of the political administration, the criminal justice administration, and other key institutions such as the schools, as well as the community and civil society in general. A broad consensus based on unity of purpose, agreement on the values that should inform the responses of the state, the priorities, the funding of these priorities and the willingness to make the associated sacrifices is needed (and may even be a precondition for an effective and sustainable programme of action).
1.1.5. In seeking a path away from the abyss, the Special Task Force on Crime (STFC) recognizes the work that has been done by previous Task Forces and Committees. We have sought to avoid some of their short-comings and to build on their many good ideas. But the problem is not simply one of ideas. As noted above, there are powerful interests that are bent on preserving things as they are.
1.1.6. It is with full appreciation for the enormity of the task, a spirit of confidence in the Jamaican people and optimism about our future as a nation that the STFC undertook this task of developing a Roadmap to a safer and more secure Jamaica.
1.2.Terms of Reference
1.2.1. The STFC was tasked with the responsibility to develop a roadmap for treating with the crime problem, that is, to propose “actionable strategic activities to deal with crime at the root cause and symptomatic levels.” It recognizes that there are helpful long-term efforts at institutional change and modernization that are in train that must be strengthened and accelerated. Here is emphasized the short-term actions of both a symbolic and substantive nature that can signal priorities and have an immediate impact on the problem.
1.2.2. Additionally, the remit of the Task Force required it to identify those institutionalized responses which, although requiring a longer period for implementation
4 Report of the Committee on Political Tribalism, July 1997