1.5.3. The Report of the National Committee on Crime and Violence (October 2001) has had similar treatment meted out to it. Astonishingly, the contents of the document signed in Parliament by the ruling and opposition parties had been altered from the original submitted by the Committee. It is expected that these and similar reports, including this one, will be subjected to critical scrutiny and political negotiations that may alter them is some ways. In order to become policy, they must enter the political process and become subject to it. This is on the face of it a healthy aspect of democratic decision-making. Nevertheless, this kind of action raises the issue of the extent to which a sound, rationally grounded report coming out of a properly constituted committee, can be “doctored” and still retain its integrity.
1.5.4. In the actual implementation of the recommendations contained in the Report of the National Committee on Crime and Violence, the implementers have displayed a tendency to “cherry pick” from among the recommendations. This approach is very evident in the treatment of recommendations pertaining to the Jamaica Constabulary Force where there has been a demonstrated preference for conditions of work and hardware solutions, while ignoring structural and policy changes that are critical to achieving the intended outcomes.
1.5.5. The STFC would be remiss if it did not point out a failing that has conspired against the implementation of the recommendations emanating from the work of similarly constituted and well-intentioned bodies. Resources have typically not been made available for the implementation phase. This is especially telling in the area of social interventions where the relevant agencies of Government have tight budgets tied to work programmes built around narrow mandates. There is also no history of cooperation between or among these agencies.
1.5.6. While recognizing that there are institutionalized challenges in how Government works – e.g. budgetary limitations and cultural challenges, if the members of this Task Force had to identify a single cause for inaction it would be lack of political will and leadership.
1.5.7. If these recommendations are to be successfully implemented, then the people of Jamaica will have to see demonstrated a greater level of leadership and accountability.
1.6.Structure of the Rest of the Report
1.6.1. The rest of the report is in three sections. In the first section an attempt is made to characterize the current situation in the country with respect to crime and security challenges. The roots of the problem are then identified. In the next section, the Roadmap