Uricks further informed Huizinga that Heather was a CPA, which provided additional
assurance of the accuracy of the figures contained in the financial documents. We reject
the Uricks’ argument that Huizinga failed to exercise due diligence because, they argue,
Huizinga “never exercised his right to access [Blinds, Inc.’s] records” and “did not
attempt to verify Blinds[,] Inc.’s year-end profitability or taxable income[.]” Appellant’s
Brief at 21, 22. Pursuant to their operational arrangement, Heather was responsible for
inputting information regarding expenses and accounts payable into Blinds, Inc.’s
corporate tax returns. The trial court’s finding that Huizinga reasonably relied upon the
Uricks’ representations, therefore, is not clearly erroneous.
The final element is that the Uricks’ material misrepresentations proximately
caused Huizinga’s injury. “‘Proximate cause’ exists when there is ‘some direct relation
between the injury asserted and the injurious conduct alleged.’” Keesling, et al. v.
Beegle, et al., 858 N.E.2d 980, 992 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (quoting Raybestos Prod. Co. v.
Younger, et al., 54 F.2d 1234, 1243 (7th Cir. 1995)), trans. pending. The Uricks’ material
misrepresentations regarding the financial health of WFD, Inc. and Blinds, Inc. led
Huizinga to agree to pay $400,000 for Blinds, Inc., and to actually pay more than half of
There was sufficient evidence of actual fraud and, therefore, the trial court did not
err in finding against Mark upon his claim of breach of contract and in favor of Huizinga
upon his claim of actual fraud. We need not address the Uricks’ contentions regarding