reimbursement as special damages, for any reasonable expenditures incurred as a
proximate result of the fraudulent conduct. Id. The rescinding party must also restore all
benefits received under the contract. Id.
Huizinga contends the trial court’s damages award was insufficient because “it
should have included recovery of Huizinga’s outstanding debts and business expenditures
incurred as a foreseeable result of reliance on the misrepresentations.” Appellee’s Brief at
32. The Uricks’ misrepresentations induced Huizinga to purchase Blinds, Inc. Incurring
debt and making business expenditures were the foreseeable result of operating a
business, not of purchasing one. Essentially, Huizinga requests a return to the status quo,
which is effectuated by contract rescission. Huizinga, however, did not seek rescission;
“rescission” was not mentioned in his counsel’s opening or closing statements, nor was it
requested in his counterclaim or third-party complaint.
Even assuming Huizinga requested rescission in his general prayer for “all other
proper relief[,]” Appellant’s Appendix at 47, he failed to prove his right to rescind and his
ability to return any property received under the contract. See A.J.’s Auto. Sales, Inc. v.
Freet, 725 N.E.2d 955 (party seeking rescission bears burden of proving his right to
rescind and ability to return property received). To the contrary, Huizinga sold or
otherwise dispensed with Blinds, Inc.’s inventory, sold or otherwise dispensed with the
collateral that secured his debt to Mark, and terminated the lease of at least one of Blinds,
Inc.’s retail locations. Huizinga, therefore, was not entitled to contract rescission and,
thus, a return to the pre-contractual status quo. Huizinga was entitled to general damages
equal to the sum of the payments made to Mark for the purchase of Blinds, Inc., because 17