recent FMS report published by LMI for OSD (TP) highlighted some of the vetting issues.
MAJ Eric Fagerheim, SDDC, reported that SDDC is assessing the Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) and Common Access Card (CAC) for base entry. Mr. Earhart stated that while the CAC, TWIC, and Personal Identity Verification (PIV), authenticate, identify, and provide verification that an individual is not a threat, the base/installation commander still has responsibility to determine need to access. As such, OUSD (I) is working to understand the architecture of the various automated systems that are in place at DoD’s installations to see if it is possible to send advance information to the receiving facility that proves the driver needs access to the facility. At the minimum, an authoritative vetting database is needed to determine an individual’s identity and verify the identity against the National Counterterrorism Center.
Mr. Figueroa, DHS, suggested that a TWIC representative from TSA or the Coast Guard be invited to brief at the next ICG meeting.
AIP 6 – Foreign Military Sales AA&E Assessment
Foreign Military Sales AA&E Assessment
Mr. Ken Stombaugh, LMI, provided a brief overview of a recent LMI assessment that looked at the safety and security of AA&E movement through Foreign Military Sales (FMS) distribution channels. The study focused on the transport of AA&E while in the custody of the foreign nation and/or their agents (i.e. moving outside the Defense Transportation System). While the title of the goods sold through the FMS program passes to the purchasing country at origin, the purchasing country is still required to follow DoD’s transportation security requirements after they take custody of the shipment.
Below is brief overview of a few of the assessment’s key recommendations that LMI proposed DoD implement. Refer to the Improving the Intransit Safety and Security of Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives while in Foreign Military Sales Distribution Channels report published in May 2008 for a complete list of findings and recommendations.
Recommendation 1: Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) should incorporate the necessary provisions from DoD 5100.76-M and the DTR into DoD 5105.38-M, Security Assistance Management Manual (SAMM), so that implementing agencies and purchasing countries only need to reference and be familiar with a single policy covering transportation safety and security.
Recommendation 2: DSCA should finalize the requirement that transportation plans be developed for all sensitive AA&E shipments. A detailed
AA&E Interagency Coordination Group Minutes – June 3, 20084